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ABSTRACT  
   
This thesis seeks to build upon the empirical use of the Copenhagen 
School of security studies by evaluating and investigating speech-acts in 
recent Guatemalan newspaper media as they relate to drug trafficking within 
the geopolitical borders of Guatemala, particularly induced by Los Zetas, a 
Mexican drug cartel. The study attempts to engage a critical theoretical 
framework to study securitization within the country and thereby build upon 
the theory by conducting real-life analysis. Using a research program that is 
made up of content and text analysis of national press and presidential 
speeches, I test several hypotheses that pertain to the processes of 
Guatemala's current drug trade and drug trafficking securitization. By coding 
securitizing speech-acts and discursive frames in the national print media, I 
identify the national elite, the power relations between the national elite and 
citizenship, and attempts to dramatize the issue of drug trade. Upon 
analyzing the findings of such securitization, I propose several hypotheses as 
to why the national elite seeks high politicization of drug trade and the 
implications that rest on such drastic measures. This thesis itself, then, has 
important implications: it uses empirical tools to help further the theoretical 
foundations of the Copenhagen School, it examines the process of 
securitization study from a real world context outside the developed world, 
and it presents important information on the possible consequences of 
securitizing drug trade. 
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CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION 
This thesis seeks to critically engage how security studies identify 
securitizing speech-acts in Guatemalan newspaper media and presidential 
discourse as they pertain to drug trafficking along the Mexico-Guatemala 
border. With much criticism toward the Copenhagen School’s applicability in 
real life as a research program, this study attempts to add to the scarce 
literature of placing the theoretical framework of the school into real-life 
context.  In doing so, this thesis will test several hypotheses.  (1) As the 
Mexican drug cartel, Los Zetas, crossed into Guatemala, the Guatemalan 
national elite will seek to dramatize and frame drug trafficking as a security 
measure, necessitating direct, immediate, and often military action outside 
less dramatized actions by the state which can include social programs, 
economic adjustments or programs, or political legislation.  (2) As a tool of 
legitimating securitization, national media outlets’ coverage of drug trade 
and trafficking along with government verbal responses will increasingly 
host security discourse.  (3) The discursive practices will limit state action 
pathways and allow for others not normally justifiable by a democratic state, 
such as using military personnel to violently counter non-state 
actors/citizens within its own political borders.   
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Literature Review 
The Copenhagen School (CS) of security studies derives its theoretical 
foundations from a lineage of critical international relations theory, which in 
itself stemmed from deviating frameworks of mainstream IR.  Critical IR, and 
more specifically, critical security studies research precipitates as a reaction 
to the assertions provided by traditional scholars.  Realist theories follow 
several key assumptions that allow the theoretical framework of the realist 
subsets to maintain predictive power.1  States serve as the unit of analysis 
and remain the actors of the world system.  Additionally, states are rational, 
unitary actors that produce actions based on their own national interest. 
                                                        
1
 For a general, though not comprehensive, introduction to realism and its 
subsets see the following: Classical Realism: Thucydides, “The Melian 
Dialogue,” The History of the Peloponnesian War; and E. H. Carr‟s The Twenty 
Year Crisis, 1919-1939.  These authors provide the foundations of realist theory 
in which the world system is made up of states in an anarchical environment all 
seeking to survive against one another.  Neorealism: Kenneth Waltz‟s Theory of 
International Politics; Waltz, Summer 2001, “Structural Realism After the Cold 
War,” International Security, Vol 25, No 1; and Robert Jervis, Autumn 1998, 
“Realism in the Study of World Politics,” World Politics, Vol 52, No 4, 971-991.  
The basic tenets of neorealist theory establish themselves from a need to deal 
more systematically with the debate between classical realism versus idealism.  
Beginning with Waltz, they argue that balances form between state powers and if 
such balances deconstruct, interstate wars occur.  A shortcoming of this argument 
is that it hardly explains the causes of war and states have little choice in their 
own behavioral patterns. Neorealist Variants: Stephen Walt, Spring 1985, 
“Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power,” International Security Vol. 9, 
No. 4; John Mearsheimer‟s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; and Stephen 
van Evera, 1998, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International 
Security, Vol 22, No 4, 5-23.  Contemporary realism has now been divided 
between two camps: offensive (championed by John Mearsheimer) and defensive 
(championed by Waltz and Jervis).  Although Watlz and Jervis contend that states 
are not penchant to attack each other except by miscalculation, others, like 
Mearsheimer, describe states as expansionistic in nature, and thus, more inclined 
to promote such behavior.  
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There exists no actor above states capable of regulating their (states’) 
interactions (Waltz 1979).   
In a similar vein, neoliberal theorists, though they debate with 
(neo)realists on several points, maintain much of the same theoretical 
foundations, which keeps neoliberalism streamlined for traditional research.  
Championed by Robert Keohane and his seminal work, After Hegemony: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, neoliberalism grew 
out of reaction to neorealist perspectives.  Still resting on game theory and 
rational actors, neoliberal scholars seek to explain cooperation amongst 
states, even without a hegemonic power present (Keohane 1984).  Similarly, 
both realism and neoliberalism, as Robert Jervis discusses in his “Realism, 
Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” start from the 
assumption that states seek to cooperate with one another through the 
absence of a sovereign which can “make and enforce binding agreements” 
(1999, 43).2   Concerned more with states’ interests for absolute gains rather 
                                                        
2
 Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, often considered the first and most 
prominent proponents of neoliberalism. See, Keohane and Martin, January 1999, 
“Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation,” Working Paper 1999-2007, 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. p3.  For other 
works emphasizing either neoliberal institutionalism or the differences and 
similarities between neoliberal and neorealist theories, see Robert Axelrod, June 
1981, “The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists,” American Political 
Science Review, Vol 75, 306-318; Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, Autumn 1998, 
“Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions,” International 
Organization, vol 52, No 4; Stephan Krasner, 1985, International Regimes, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press; and Kenneth Oye, ed, 1986, Cooperation Under 
Anarchy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
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than relative gains,3 the neoliberal theory concentrates around 
institutionalism, arguing not only that institutions matter, but how they 
matter.  For neoliberal institutionalists, mutually beneficial arrangements 
exist but states forgo them because they fear others will take advantage of 
them.  
Soon, the IR subfield of political science began to question some basic 
assumptions provided by the two domineering camps.  Constructivism, first 
seen as critical, has now generally been accepted into mainstream IR theory.  
As Alexander Wendt (1992), a champion of constructivism, states in his 
seminal piece, “Anarchy is What States Make of it,” neoliberals and 
neoliberalists share a common commitment to rationalism (391).  He goes on 
to state that, when committed to specific theoretical approaches, some 
research questions are allowed to be pursued while others are not (391).  
From this rationalist approach, agents’ identities and interests are treated as 
given exogenously and thus, offers a behavioral conception of process and 
institutions to make identities and interests immutable (391).  Jepperson, 
Wendt, and Katzenstein (1996) claim that this focus on material capabilities 
of states as defining environments makes researchers take the important 
attributes of identity and interest, established through norms and broadly 
                                                        
3
 According to Robert Jervis (1994) in “Realism, Neoliberalism, and 
Cooperation,” this difference should not be overemphasized.  Neoliberals have 
soon acknowledged that it is dangerous for one state to seek absolute gains, as it 
would put the state as a relative disadvantage with an adversary.  
  5 
construed institutions, for granted (43).4  For constructivists, the story of 
state action differs. Instead of behavior solely changing, the interests and 
identities of the states change, resulting in permitted and unpermitted 
behaviors.5   
Where, then, does critical IR fit in with these theories?  Beginning with 
two seminal articles, critical theory, began with Robert Cox’s (1981) “Social 
Forces, States, and World Orders” and Richard Ashley’s (1981) “Political 
Realism and Human Interests.”  Contesting the problematic of positivist IR—
that is, empirical, scientific IR—Cox discusses two purposes of theory.  The 
first enlists a direct, conventional form, and that is to be a “guide to help 
solve the problems posed within the terms of the particular perspective 
which was the point of departure” (1981, 128).  In essence, theory as 
traditional IR implements it is tainted by a perspective that allows 
                                                        
4
 Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (1996) in “Norms, Identity, and 
Culture in National Security” do, however, state that neoliberalists view norms 
and institutions (how identity and interests are viewed) do matter on domestic and 
international levels, but that for the most part, attention to varying constructions 
of actor identities is not given.  For examples of this, see, Uday A. Mehta, 1990, 
“Liberal Strategies of Exclusion,” Politics and Society, Vol 18. No. 4, 457-454; 
Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds, 1993, After the Cold 
War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, 
Cambridge: Harvard University.  
 
5
 For a thorough introduction to constructivism in international relations 
theory see: Alexander Wendt, Spring 1992, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: 
The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, 
No. 2, Boston: MIT Press, 391-425; Peter Katzenstein, ed, 1996, The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia 
University Press; Ted Hopf. Summer, 1998, “The Promise of Constructivism in 
International Relations,” International Security, Vol 23, No. 1, 171-200; and John 
Ruggie, Autumn 1998, “What Makes the World Hang Together: International 
Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization. Vol 54, No. 
4, 855-885. 
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researchers to only research what their theory permits.  The second purpose, 
reflecting on the process of theorizing, is to become aware of the perspective 
which gives rise to theorizing, and its “relation to other perspectives” (Cox 
1981, 128).  This ‘perspective on perspective’ forms the basis of critical 
theory as this realization helps open up the possibility of choosing a different, 
valid perspective.  Cox (1981) delineates this critical aspect by declaring this 
second purpose as standing apart from the prevailing order (129).  It does 
not take institutions or power relations for granted but calls them into 
question by investigating the origins of such relations and how or whether 
they might be changing.   
Although surviving a battery of criticisms to its lack of empirical 
means to determine and examine power relations, critical theory does not 
seek the common goals of empiricism: to delineate patterns and maintain 
predictability through theoretical frames.  Instead, this postpositivist regime 
concerns itself with investigating “how-possible” questions in International 
Relations.  For example, Roxanne Doty (1993) asks how it was possible for 
the subjects of the Philippines to be subjectively constituted so as to allow 
the United States’ to pursue an interventionist policy in the 1950s in spite of 
state sovereignty claims by the Philippines (299).  Instead of asking why the 
U.S. would act accordingly, or why the Philippines allowed such action, Doty 
instead sought to identify the mechanisms at play that allowed for 
anomalous action.  This is an essential point for critical theory.  
  7 
Robert Cox (1981) and Andrew Linklater (1990) both expertly clarify 
this point of divergence from positivist functions.  Because the critical frame 
allows for a normative choice in favor of a social and political order, the 
principal objective, then, is to clarify this range of possible alternatives.  
Critical theory can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order, but 
historical processes restrict, limit, and constrain this ‘picture’ (Cox as cited by 
Linklater 1990, 28).  This alternative order shows itself through power 
relations as perceived through discourse.  As Linklater (2001) suggests,  
judges social arrangements by their capacity to embrace open 
dialogue with all others and envisages new forms of political 
community which break with unjustified exclusion . . . [it] 
envisages the use of an unconstrained discourse to determine 
the moral significance of national boundaries and to examine 
the possibility of post-sovereign forms of national life. 
 
Heavily influenced by Jurgen Habermas,6 critical theory for International 
Relations contest the current system not as immutable, but as a changing 
tapestry of power relations where these “social arrangements” form through 
“open dialogue” to permit and prohibit various types of action in an 
arrangements of environments.  Through discourse, then, does critical theory 
find the foundation of power.  How do actors make objects of others? How 
                                                        
6
 Jürgen Habermas has made significant contributions to IR by  the 
development of the concept and theory of communicative reason or 
communicative rationality, which distinguishes itself from the rationalist tradition 
by locating rationality in structures of interpersonal linguistic communication 
rather than in the structure of either the knowing subject. This social theory 
advances the goals of human emancipation, while maintaining an inclusive 
universalist moral framework. This framework emphasizes “speech-acts” in 
which words are used for an end result — the goal of mutual understanding, and 
that human beings possess the communicative competence to bring about such 
understanding.  See, Habermas, Jürgen, 1981, Theory of Communicative Action, 
Boston: Beacon Press.  
  8 
does the powerful or dominant group refer to those outside the group? And 
how do those referent groups now act as part of the roles they play as 
objects?  These questions, and many more, critical theorists can now 
investigate through a postpostivist lens that permits them to ask other 
research questions and to look outside the traditional theoretical frames to 
view what others within the mainstream cannot.7  
Similarly, critical security studies scholars now seek to answer 
traditionally excluded questions from the research program.  Viewing 
security as a process embedded into social interactions and purposive 
discourse, critical theorists have moved away from analyzing state action and 
military armament and movements.  Instead, critical theory seeks to uncover 
how actors choose what topics deserve military attention, and how the 
words used in discussing those political issues provide alternative pathways 
of action to be followed.  
Keith Krause (1998) provides a great delineation of contemporary 
critical theory research regimes for security studies.  In his work, he breaks 
scholarship into three main components.  The first departure for critical 
studies inquires how threats are defined and constructed, which opposes the 
mainstream conceptualization of threat as arising from the material 
capabilities of possible opponents (Krause 1998, 306-309).  He moves 
                                                        
7
 For an updated and thorough discussion on the origins and current 
direction of critical theory in International Relations see Regger, Nicholas and 
Ben Thirkell-White, 2007, “Introduction: Still Critical After All These Years? 
The Past, Present and Future of Critical Theory in International Relations,” 
Review of International Studies. Vol 33, British International Studies Association, 
3-24. 
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onward to delineate how the object of security itself is constructed and is 
inextricable from the discourse of threats (Krause 1998, 309).  We will see 
how this process occurs later on in our conversation about the Copenhagen 
School of security studies and the speech-act procession.  This departs from 
rationalist perspectives in a critical way by the traditional assumptions and 
‘given’ that the object of national security is the state.  The state is the 
primary locus of security and authority and has an obligatory responsibility 
to protect the state (which is equivalent to protecting the citizenship).  Those 
outside of the state can present the threats to the state, making relations 
between countries on strategic terms (Grieco 1988, Mearsheimer 1994, 
1995; 9-13).    
The final departure of critical theory for security studies retaliates 
against the mainstream axiomatic supposition that the security dilemma; 
that is, states in a system of anarchy will always be seeking to survive and 
protect themselves from ever-present threats to security (Jervis 1978, Lynn-
Jones 1995).  The response to ameliorating or overcoming the security 
dilemma has deviated from any particular path by critical theory.  Some 
propose transcending the dilemma through security networks of states in 
which states consciously participate (Deudney 1995, Adler and Barnett 
1998).  Others like Chilton (1996) and Chilton and Llyin (1993) rework the 
concept of security by examining the underpinnings of Cold War discourse.  
By investigating the formulation and implications of the containment 
doctrine and the conceptualizations of a “common house” for post-Cold War 
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security in Europe, he concludes that “an important consequence of the 
emphasis on language and communication in the construction of policies and 
realities is the fact…that political policies take place within political cultures 
and within particular languages” (Chilton 1996, 6).   Subsuming these 
deviations from conventional IR assumptions, the Copenhagen School of 
security studies has comprehensively advanced the methodological and 
theoretical arguments presented by critical security researchers by opening 
up the study to a variety of ‘non-security’ security issues.  
The Copenhagen School (CS) won wide acclaim as one of the most 
thorough and continuous exploration approaches to the “widening agenda in 
Security Studies” (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009).  More traditional Security 
Studies delineate the field as focusing mainly on the phenomenon of war by 
assuming a possible conflict between states, using the state as its unit of 
analysis, and arguing that although topics of interest unrelated to military 
power may affect security, their inclusion remains unnecessary (Bull 1968; 
Martin 1980; Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988; Walt 1991).   Traditionalists have 
berated critical focus by stating, in the words of Nye and Lynn-Jones (1998), 
“a subject that is only remotely related to central political problems of threat 
perception and management among sovereign states would be regarded as 
peripheral” (7).  It remains clear that mainstream scholars have intentionally 
marginalized and excluded critical theorist work.  
Reacting to what Walt (1991), and many others, labeled as the 
“Golden Age” of security studies in the 1970s, the Copenhagen School, 
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championed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, sought to 
expand the fixed boundaries of this traditional perspective.  And, although 
Walt acknowledges that nonmilitary phenomena can threaten states and 
individuals (Buzan 1983), Walt states that this “prescription” runs the risk of 
expanding security studies excessively, and can include such issues like 
pollution, disease, and economic recessions—a severe detriment to the field 
by way of destroying its “intellectual coherence” (1991).  The School argues 
otherwise.  
In his “Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study 
of International Relations,” Barry Buzan discusses the need for widening the 
definition of security studies (1984).  He asserts that the main problem with 
International Relations is the polarization of research around anarchy and 
peace, and that a proper security-based approach allows for a more balanced 
perspective than either of the two paradigms and would help recover 
obscured middle ground by bridging the two concepts (1984, 17). Buzan, 
along with Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde expanded on this assertion with 
their work, Security: A New Framework for Analysis.  This seminal work lays 
the groundwork for the Copenhagen School by providing a more critical lens 
to security’s scope by identifying four sectors beyond the military sector of 
security: environmental, economic, societal, and political (1998, see also 
Buzan 1991).   By expanding the types of issues and conflicts that fall under 
the label of “security,” CS fundamentally changed the way to study security. 
Instead of analyzing state action, military funding, arms races, and violent 
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moves of one military against another military, academics should now 
analyze security through the process of “securitization” (1998, 23-26).  
Theoretically, in this perspective, any public issue can be located on a 
spectrum that ranges from nonpoliticized (not touched by the state) to 
politicized (dealt by the state in public policy or some form of communal 
governance) to securitized (requiring emergency measures and justifying 
actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure, and not necessarily 
through the means of the state) (1998, 23-24).  In this practice, any public 
issue can move between the three conditional phases of being, and thus, any 
issue can undergo securitization under certain conditions.   
In this approach, the meaning of a concept lies in its usage—the 
discursive practices behind the concept.  As Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 
(1998) put it, “the meaning lies not in what people consciously think the 
concept means but in how they implicitly use it in some ways and not others 
(24).  For example, this paper presents the issues of Mexican drug cartels and 
drug trade inside the state of Guatemala. Does drug trade necessarily 
constitute a security issue for Guatemala? Could it be framed as an economic 
issue? A public policy issue?  An issue that can be taken care of through social 
program? The power, then, rests in discursive actions that attempt to 
dramatize and, as a result, securitize issues beyond the realm of normal 
politics.  In several instances, Ole Waever (1988, 1995) shows that textual 
analysis suggests something is designated as an international security issue 
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because “it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues 
and should take absolute priority” (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998).  
Michael Williams (2003) labels these securitizing moves as “speech 
acts.”  According to Williams and CS, securitization describes security as 
having a particular discursive and political force and is, as Lene Hansen and 
Helen Nissenbaum (2009) describe it, a concept that does something rather 
than an objective condition.  Through specific authoritative actors, known as 
the national elite, certain issues are placed in a discursive framework or 
rhetorical structure where an issue is dramatized.  And thus, by labeling it as 
security worthy an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by 
extraordinary means (Williams 2003).  From this perspective, the School 
counters the argument that this framework for analysis allows anything to be 
securitized.  As Williams (2003) describes, labeling an issue as security-
worthy defines something as threatening and in need of urgent response, 
making the process of securitization studied through discourse.  Thus, this 
conceptualization of security places security within a framework of 
communicative action that links the topic to a discursive ethic that “seek[s] to 
avoid the excesses of a decisionist account of securitization.”  Specifically, 
this communicative action forces securitization in a discourse of 
legitimization with a possibility of argument, presenting evidence, etc to 
prevent an overabundance of threats (Risse 2000, Williams 2003). 
Harkening back to Habermas (1981), this theory of communicative 
action and power in discourse has a long line of research in critical studies.  
  14 
In seeking to identify the discourses of resistance to the dominant actors of 
society, Richard Terdiman (1985) shows how language has not only been a 
tool of power by the dominant but also that at such heightened times of 
dominant discourse penetration, discourses of resistance are at equal play, 
though oblivious by dominant discourse (38-40). This allows for a “self-
reproduction” of dominance (Terdiman 1985, 40).  Terdiman ultimately 
draws an equation between this critical aspect of power relations through 
language and more materialist models by finding a point of convergence 
through a heirarchized struggle between dominant and subdominant. This 
recalls the often-cited philosophical arguments of Michel Foucault, in which 
he states, “What then is at stake, unless it be desire and power.”8 Language is 
power, and one can analyze power by researching what language is used by 
whom and how.  
The final important aspect of CS is the intersubjectivity of 
securitization.  The national elite may framing an issue under the umbrella of 
security does not guarantee success (Waever 1995). Successful securitization 
is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the speech act: does 
the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value 
by the national elite?  The audience must believe and accept the security 
framing as true and valid in order for securitization to take place and for 
extraordinary means to be utilized and legitimized (Buzan, Waever, and de 
Wilde 1998).  Critical investigations of securitizing will need to include some 
                                                        
8
 Cf. Foucault, L’ordre du discours, 22. 
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sort of measure or assessment of how the non-dominant group of potential 
actors receives the language frames in their own understanding of the 
politicized issue and its effective maintenance or abatement.  Critical 
theorists concede that this measurement, like all subjective measurements in 
a critical or traditionalist study, is often difficult to capture and remains open 
to interpretation of the ‘correct,’ though critical theorists would seem to 
assert there can be no correct, manner in which to conduct this attribute to 
securitization.   
 By outlining the defining aspects of the Copenhagen School 
securitization theory, it becomes clearer how securitization can be studied in 
the context of Guatemala and why it is important.  Some previous works have 
successfully included CS into the realm of real-life situations from both statist 
and non-statist perspectives.  Didier Bigo (2006) studied post-9/11 
discourse by the United States and its allies which put forth assertions 
necessitating a globalized security with unprecedented intensity and reach.  
These states justified themselves by propagating the idea of global 
(in)security, attributed to the development of threats and mass destruction, 
thought to derive from terrorist and criminal organizations and their 
supporting governments. Similarly, Campbell (1993) and Aradau (2001) 
have shown that some issues rose and faded in the public imagination 
through the discourse of securitization largely independent from the “actual” 
or empirical degree of threat.  
  16 
Although the number of studies incorporating CS theory into their 
research programs remains more limited than the positivist body (one of the 
aims of the paper is to add to the literature), the current situation occurring 
in Guatemala allows for an opportune time to study the processes of 
securitization and add theoretically and fundamentally valuable information 
to the framework.  With a thorough and timely study to capture the rich 
environmental and contextual reality at work in this underdeveloped 
country, this study can remove the body of literature from the dominant 
focus on core states to the outlying periphery in hopes to track any changes 
or alterations in the politicization procedures at play.  As a sort of test to the 
Copenhagen School, this study will seek to further develop the theoretical 
conditions and aim to contribute to its generalizability.  With a new address 
to the developing world, we can outline new research avenues that observe 
more drastic implications on the securitization process of dominating actors, 
how Third World countries react to (non-)state agitators within and without 
territorial borders, and how this changes the overall political stability of the 
state.  Specifically looking at Guatemala will also permit a chance to move 
away from purely theoretical and scientific discussion and provide a genuine 
policymaking implication to the state of Guatemala and its current state of 
affairs.  
Studying the case of Guatemala with a critical lens proves pertinent 
and beneficial in investigating the mechanics behind securitization.  It 
answers the how-possible question that needs to be answered.  In his 
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inaugural speech in January 2008, newly elected President Alvaró Colom 
interwove socially focused rhetoric to “‘overcome intolerance, inequality, 
discrimination, and lack of solidarity” as Guatemala moves in a new 
direction.9  In essence, he campaigned on and continued discourse on 
providing and building social programs in order to develop Guatemala.  
However, just two short months afterward, the social directives on the 
agenda were placed on the backburner of indefinite postponement as the 
drug-trafficking tale took a new turn.  On March 28, 2008, a ferocious gun 
battle between Guatemalan and Mexican cartels broke out in La Laguna, 
which left 11 people dead, including Juan "Juancho" León, the Guatemalan 
leader of the Sayaxché cartel (Reynolds 2008). Los Zetas, Mexico’s most 
technologically advanced, sophisticated, and violent paramilitary drug cartel, 
appears to have intended to displace local Guatemalan cartels and take 
control of the country’s major drug routes (2008).  
Over the past two and a half years, scarce reports and news stories 
have indicated that Los Zetas have increasingly infiltrated a limited 
geopolitical space through often violent measures as a result of the 
crackdown the Mexican government has placed on its drug cartels (Reynolds 
2008; Roplogle 2008; and International Crisis Group 2010).  As Marcela 
Sanchez of the Latin American Herald Tribune wrote, “Just as eradication and 
interdiction efforts have largely pushed coca production from country to 
country, cracking down on drug cartels seems to be moving them into more 
                                                        
9
 Inés Benitez, 2008, “New President Pledges „Privileges for the Poor,” 
InterPress Service News Agency. 
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permissive countries.”10  From there, news reports of arms building including 
military helicopter purchases, military units moving into the conflicted areas, 
and international security initiatives with bordering states began to 
immediately develop from the state of Guatemala.  Guatemala, from a 
traditional security sense, was responding to a security threat as presented 
by drug trafficking. 
How was it possible, then, to move the country away from the 
promised social democracy and welfare state creation to a military-focused, 
security-driven nation?  By looking at the rhetoric and speech-acts created by 
the national elite, I was able to examine the seminal attempts and processes 
of securitizing drug trafficking along the Mexico-Guatemala border.  Using 
the research design delineated in the next section and the theoretical 
framework of CS, I can test the hypotheses in the overview.  Once the how-
possible question has been answered can a student of security studies then 
ask the why-possible question in which the investigations of why Guatemala 
would want to securitize the issue can be answered.  Because this lies beyond 
the bounds of this study, I can only offer hypotheses, centered on both 
international and domestic factors, as to why the state would seek such 
action.   And, in the concluding remarks, it would seem responsible to engage 
desecuritization theory, which states that desecuritization is always more 
desirable than securitization (Waever 1995; Taureck 2006; Stritzel 2007).  
                                                        
10
 Marcela Sanchez, 2010, “Guatemala‟s Drug Threat in a Post Drug-War 
Era,” Latin American Herald Tribune, http://www.laht.com, accessed November 
1, 2010. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design for this project consists of two main parts. The 
first tests the hypotheses related to purposive speech-acts by the 
government to dramatize and highly politicize drug trade through 
government sponsored media.  Because there were limitations with 
accessing all of the archived media for the length of time in which the Colom 
administration has been in office, I also looked at a variety of presidential 
addresses and speeches to the public at large from Alvaró Colom’s inaugural 
year.  
Because the Mexican drug cartels have only recently moved across the 
Mexico-Guatemala border, much of the official government documents 
produced by the internal security, military, and intelligence agencies of the 
Guatemalan state remain classified. However, by using content analysis to 
investigate the Diario de Centro América (Central American Daily), I can 
identify the purposive measures enacted by the national elite. Diario de 
Centro América is the public record of the Guatemalan government11 
provided in both physical print and online forms.  The online source is an 
exact, digitized copy of the printed source, meaning that one can similarly 
identify the news sections, pages, and formatting as one would with a printed 
paper. Because the newspaper is a government sponsored venture as 
opposed to other highly circulating sources, like La Prensa Libre (The Free 
                                                        
11
 Diario de Centro América: El Diario Público de Guatemala, 1880, 
http://dca.gob.gt, Accessed November 3, 2010.  
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Press) or Nuestra Diario (Our Daily), I claim that examining this news source 
will allow for proper analysis of the government’s intentions and purposes. 
Diario de Centro América will provide elite opinion and intent first by 
providing news it deems proper to provide to the citizenship of the country 
(drugs) and second by slanting or framing the news pieces provided in 
positive or negative tones.  This purposive framing will elicit the intentions of 
the national elite, thus indicating the role of authority and power over the 
general public in creating highly politicized space to deal effectively with 
drug trafficking.   
These tones will be derived through content analysis of the provided 
articles, which will fit the design as content analysis is the “study of recorded 
human communications” (Babbie [2007] 2010, 333). Using a code sheet 
(Appendix A) developed specifically for this research program, I will identify 
securitizing features in the articles related to drug trade and trafficking.  For 
the purposes of this design, I have used the theoretical literature to break 
purposive framing into three attributes: threat perception creation, “us 
versus them” perception creation, and high politicization or, dramatization. 
Threat perception creation, as opposed to the threat perception integrated 
into the citizenship’s perspective of the situation, relates to the framing of 
drug trade, in this case, by the state as a situation that requires immediate 
and powerful attention and action by the state itself because drug trade risks 
the well-being or existence of some ‘object’ of Guatemala.  
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The research design for this program stresses the incorporation of the 
five security sectors outlined by the Copenhagen School, which both 
broadens and refines the subfield to include more potential realms in which 
security issues can surface but with the process of securitization only specific 
issues deemed by both elite and common audiences can be included within 
the subfield.  The most common sectors for security are the military and 
political theatres.  The military sector includes the actors that most attribute 
to traditional security studies.  Largely, the state serves as the securitizing 
actor toward external or internal threats to the state’s sovereignty.  For 
external threats, military security outcomes precipitate from a two-level 
interplay of manifest militarization and latent militarized perceptions and 
intentions, that is, initiating the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of 
the state and, heightening and militarizing the other’s perceived capabilities 
and intentions, respectively (Buzan et al 1998).  Political security refers to 
the “organizational stability of social order(s)” (141).  Although theoretically 
less coherent from its sector counterparts, political security refers to issues 
receiving high politicization that would not fall into the four remaining 
sectors (140-142).  The political threats aim at the organizational stability of 
the state with targets possibility related to the idea of the state, its national 
identity, ideology, and its institutions (Buzan 1991). 
Economic, environmental, and societal security sectors complete the 
set as less traditional security realms but also more defined.  Economic 
security positions itself in the debates about international political economy 
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concerning the nature of the relationship between the political structure of 
anarchy and the economic structure of the market (Buzan 1991, 230).  Actors 
could include states, international organizations, classes, firms, or any 
arrangement threatened economically by the current condition of affairs.  
The environmental sector relates to the interweaving of environmental and 
political agendas usually embedded in non-governmental and scientific 
organizations and governmental and media outlets, respectively (Buzan et al 
1998).  This sector can and does include issues such as ecosystem 
destruction, energy and population problems, food shortages or limitations, 
and degradation of natural landscapes. The societal sector’s conceptual 
organization centers on identity (119).  The identity could be of the nation as 
a whole, or any group cleaved along religious, ethnic, political, gender, 
educational, or socioeconomic lines.  If a group of individuals maintain a 
collective identity and that identity is threatened by an object, securitization 
can begin to take place.     
In every sector, some form of elite seeks to dramatize and highly 
politicize issues that threaten them.  For this study, the elite take issue with 
drug trade and trafficking, in which the only coping path of action is 
immediate and extreme. By breaking down the “threat” attribute into six 
sectors outlined by Security: A New Framework for Analysis, I can see which 
sectors are at threatened and at play in the securitization of trafficking. The 
sectors are all broken down with the specific details of the articles to be 
noted to record, clarify, and justify which sectors are in play. 
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The development of this threat perception creation is contingent on 
the national elite’s engagement of the audience’s “us versus them” ideational 
perception, or objectification.  By clearly dividing the identities between 
some sort of inside grouping and outside force(s), in this case, the powerful 
Mexican drug cartel, Los Zetas, the Guatemalan elite creates mutually 
exclusive groups to segregate and isolate such clusters, allowing for the 
creation of a referent object.  This, in turn, allows for an appeal of ‘logical’ 
justification for authorities to respond severely because the threatening force 
appears unnatural and inorganic to the familiar system driving the 
Guatemalan sectors.  The referent objects are the entities that are seen to be 
existentially threatened and have a legitimate claim to survival (Buzan, 
Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 36).  My analysis breaks down the dichotomous 
concept by potential groups: “Guatemalans,” “citizens,” “communities or 
towns,” “political or social groups,” or “families” for the Us factor, and “drug 
users,” “drug lords,” “drug cartels,” “Los Zetas,” “Mexicans/foreigners” for the 
Them.  By identifying such features, students of security studies can 
accurately determine what needs protecting, what does the threatening and 
also understand which security sectors are at play.  Does the culture need to 
be preserved? Does the environment need protection? How about the 
citizenship? Here, the referent objects the national elite seek to protect are 
the state, and more importantly, the nation of Guatemala.  The exclusivity of 
the groups also identifies the threatening object(s)—drug trade.  
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The final attribute of securitization efforts on behalf of the elite is high 
politicization or dramatization of politically charged concerns.  In a similar 
function as the Us v Them conception, high politicization offers the audience 
a justified explanation of how X is threatening Y and Z is needed to close the 
threat.  These efforts then make it possible to put words as action and help 
answer the how-possible question of securitization.  Extreme politicization 
takes place once the former two attributes have been established (i.e. 
validated through mentioning and perhaps logical explanation) and occurs 
through discourse relating to at least one of the security sectors in one of two 
ways: a call to action or a report on action.  Either the quoted or paraphrased 
actor(s), or article author call for drastic, extreme, or otherwise non-normal 
political action to relieve the stress from trafficking.  In the report on action, 
the article reports in a support fashion on drastic changes or attempts to 
change either ideology or structure relating to one of the sectors in response 
to drug trade and trafficking.    
I do not differentiate within my data collection the two modes of high 
politicization within the printed media, because one mode is not necessarily 
more powerful or significantly different from the other.  They are developed 
by time.  Although one may argue that reporting on action would indicate 
actual securitizing action taking place in the physical realm, the truth in this 
study still remains founded in the discursive patterns of the text.  If an out-of-
the-ordinary incident took place by municipal politician-activists but 
received a denunciatory backlash, would the audience receive and process 
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the incident as good news? Would the issue be seen as a security measure or 
an extremist move made irrelevant by the national elite? 
Through this process of hierarchical securitization, Guatemala, I 
hypothesize, will seek to inevitably infuse the advent of Los Zetas with drug 
trafficking, surveying the former as the embodiment of the latter.  By 
inextricably linking the drug cartel along with additional discourse on the 
larger picture of drug trade and trafficking, and thus the political woes of 
Guatemala, the elite’s call for immediate and acute action will seem all the 
more paramount for the public.  
Because the three attributes are hierarchical in their theoretical 
formulation, that is, one cannot create an Us versus Them perception without 
labeling the Them a threat first.  And one cannot seek ulterior, irrational, or 
extreme behavior without first establishing a threat and separated identity.  
For analytical purposes then, this relationship translates smoothly into a 
securitization scale where each article undergoes the same systematic 
categorization of ‘how much securitizing’ it does.  This scale can then also be 
implemented and expanded in the same system if comparing multiple media 
outlets or securitizing over time.   
To cover both latent and manifest content, each article will be placed 
on a scale ranging from 0 to 4, where a “0” article will have no evidence of 
securitization and a “4” article will have all evidence of securitization—threat 
perception creation, Us versus Them perception creation, high 
politicization/dramatization, and the overall emotional evocation 
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sympathetic to security labeling which will be determined by the analyzing 
the tone of the article through latent content analysis, with each variable 
receiving equal weight (i.e. 1 point per category) . On average, securitization 
would incorporate the majority of these qualities.  When the articles are 
coded, aggregated means can be placed on the scale shown in Table 1, which 
delimns the strength of the securitization attempts. The scale, then, develops 
as such:  
Table 1: Securitization Score Ranges for Averages 
Score   Meaning 
0 – .99   No securitization attempts  
1 – 1.99  Weak securitization attempts  
2 – 2.99   Securitization attempts 
3 – 4    Strong securitization attempts 
 
Once the entirety of the sample is coded, simple descriptive statistics 
will be used to provide information on the sample population of the articles.  
By looking at descriptive statistics, I determined actors—which subset, if not 
all, of the national elite—seeking to securitize drug trade along with clues as to 
what objects and the objects’ sectors are threatened.  Implementing the 
developed scale, I also tracked the progression of securitization and 
determine that if the averaged scale ranks above at 2 or above, securitization 
has happened from the projecting end to a national audience.  Additionally, 
looking at the aggregate data, I can determine that purposive speech-acts are 
occurring in both a quantitative manner—by evaluating the counts of traits 
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and tone in each article—and a qualitative manner—by investigating tone 
and feeling behind the article. Overall, I expect to find that the national elite 
seeks to use the news source, Diario de Centro América, to dramatize and 
securitize drug trade(rs), like Los Zetas, entering into Guatemala from the 
Mexico-Guatemala border in order to allow for and legitimize intensive 
action. 
The data collection will only span of available documents provided by 
the news source itself, January 2009 to December 2010, or, two years.  
Because the number of articles on the subject can be extensive from just the 
amount of news produced every day, sampling is in order to cull a 
representative sample of all available stories.  Looking only at the first news 
section, Nacional, I will randomly sample the days ranging from January 1, 
2009 to December 31, 2010.  Of the available 520 days of news produced by 
the media outlet,12 approximately 150, or just under 30% of the population, 
were sampled.  On the whole, this offered 64 articles relating to drug trade 
and trafficking that were then coded.  
This sampling system will occur for two main reasons. First, the front 
section hosts the most prevalent news about the state, according to the 
newspaper at least, and it is in this section that I expect to find the most 
pertinent, relevant, and sensational articles about drug trafficking and 
violence should securitization be occurring. In this vein, if the national elite 
aim to dramatize the drug cartels, it will seek to place the news in the first 
                                                        
12
 El Diario de Centroamerica is only produced on a Monday through 
Friday basis, thus limiting the amount of days available for sample. 
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section.  Second, this process allowed a broad and practical glimpse of 
securitization discourse over time without biasing select news days or 
running into periodicity by selective sampling patterns.  A benefit for this 
stretch of time is that the sampled section will allow a month-to-month view 
on the rise and continuation of security discourse within Guatemala.   
This first design of the research program presents several advantages 
and disadvantages in regards to reliability and validity.  Reliability, the 
quality of measurement method that suggests that the same data would have 
been collected each time in repeated observations of the same phenomenon, 
remains high in the case of context analysis. With printed materials, the 
articles can be coded and coded time again in terms of manifest content.  In 
the case of studying securitization of drug trade in Guatemala, this code sheet 
allows for paragraph analysis of news content in a government-sponsored 
newspaper. As the code sheet accounts for specific sources and enumerates 
the times certain words are used, reliability remains high as any researcher 
can tabulate the number of times certain words are used.  However, because 
I am also looking at the tones of each section for the attributes along with the 
overall article, I am coding for latent content, the underlying meaning of the 
communication.  This remains a small threat to reliability as I alone 
evaluated to negative, positive, and neutral feeling environments each author 
imbued into the article.  This cost, though, does not outweigh the benefits.  
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Latent material helps contextualize and give real meaning to the tallied 
words that comes with manifest material.13  
The inclusion to measure latent content as perceived as intonation 
from the news articles, and thus, from the national elite, several threats to 
invalidity remain at bay.  With producing a more contextual investigation in 
the content analysis, the design remains more grounded in the reality of 
discursive dramatization rather than being artificial by just tallying up how 
many times certain words are used and by whom.  Had this study just 
quantified words used, we would not be able to grasp how exactly those 
words are being used and in what context.  This design also permits higher 
content validity as the three attributes used for securitization analysis are 
exclusive and encompassing for this research program.  Potential threats to 
external validity would deal with the extrapolation and generalization of the 
discursive frame patterns found in this publication as opposed to what is 
being used/said at press conferences of the elite, in national legislative 
bodies, in national legislation, and in international organization forums.  Do 
the patterns match up?  If so, then this study remains externally valid, but if 
they do not, there exists a threat to validity.  However, such investigation is 
beyond the scope of this program.   
                                                        
13
 The best way to neutralize a threat to inter-coder reliability would be to 
train one or more coders on the researcher program and have them code the same 
articles used in the sample.  This allows for a simple average of the manifest and 
latent content analysis and helps eliminate the bias produced by having one coder.  
For this project, unfortunately, time, money, and willingness did not allow for the 
training and participation of another researcher.  
  30 
 To not solely rely on the media to provide an insight on the discursive 
patterns of the state, this study also looked at several speeches given by 
President Colom, as the chief and spokesman of the state.  See Appendix B for 
a complete list of the sampled speeches.  Speeches, as opposed to 
government law or reports, were used because 1) they are intended for 
public audiences (that is not to say law and reports are not accessible by the 
public, but speeches are more easily heard, seen, and accessed by the general 
people and 2) as the representative of the state to its people, the President’s 
discursive patterns and power will be evident in his attempts to politicize 
drug trade and legitimize action against it.  This analysis is a supplement and 
reinforcement to the data found in the public records of El Diario.  They were 
analyzed for its content at large and did not undergo the same numerical 
scrutiny as the news articles but the same evaluative technique in searching 
for securitization patterns as the articles were applied.   
From here, this paper will attempt to show both verbally and 
pictorially the securitization attempts produced by the elite actors of 
Guatemala (or beyond) toward drug trade and trafficking.  The results of the 
newspaper and speech analyses will be shown and, hopefully, adequately 
explained.  The paper will then conclude with additional research 
opportunities, hypotheses as to why Guatemala would or could securitize 
drug trafficking, and a theoretically nested illustration of why securitization 
may not be the best path for Guatemala. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NEWSPAPER ANALYSIS 
An analysis of the government daily reveals high levels of 
securitization attempted by appendages of the state producing the 
publication.  With the analysis of the dataset created by coding sixty-four 
articles sampled from a total of 150 of 520 (29%) possible days.  With this 
information, I attempt to show and explain the actors at play by investigating 
who implemented speech-acts and proposed high politicization, identify the 
referent object(s) that became existentially threatened by drug trade with 
the arrival of Los Zetas, and search beyond the ‘numbers’ the coding 
produced by elaborating more on specific articles.  This will also help 
illustrate how exactly the articles were coded.  Additionally, I will look at the 
significance and role that images play in reporting and conveying the news to 
the public.  
Description of the Sample. As mentioned, 64 articles presented 
discourse on drug trade and trafficking from the sampled 150 days.  This 
datum alone says something powerful.  Only on five rare occasions did the 
two articles, as opposed to one, come from the same day.  Thus, 59 of 150 
days, or approximately 40% of the days in which the news published a story 
on drug trade/trafficking.   Considering the potential news-worthy stories 
that make day-to-day news, especially for Guatemala which experienced 
huge economic downturns and significant natural disasters such as flooding, 
mudslides, and tropical storms throughout the sampled timeframe, having 
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40% of the daily news signifies the subject as a hot, consistent topic in for the 
state.  This point is further illustrated by the fact that the small publication 
only produced on average 7.57 stories a day in the Nacional section.  
Additionally, the articles ranged from three to seventeen paragraphs, but 
average to 8.1 paragraphs.  Because paragraphs in news stories can consist of 
one or two sentences, the seemingly wide range in length may have only 
made negligible difference in content and discourse.  Moreover, with the 
articles coded with a final, discourse-based score, and those scores averaged 
across time, the need to control for paragraphs was not necessary for this 
study.  
Referent Object(s): Part of the analysis sought to identify the referent 
object(s) that are existentially threatened by drug trade and trafficking; at 
least, that is how they are made out to be by the elite.  In many cases, a state, 
as a political unit, is often the referent object to security threats, especially 
those emanating from other states.  In others, referent objects could sift into 
the security sectors the Copenhagen School outlines—state (political), 
society (societal), environment (environmental), etc—or can represent 
myriad other choices like citizens, the political elite, institutions, and more.  
In this case, I determined the referent objects by both framing them 
into the aforementioned security sectors and then further detailing them 
specifically within the sector(s).  Expanding on the previous examples, if the 
referent object is “the formal institutions of the government,” the political 
sector would umbrella the term.  In the case of Guatemala, the threatened 
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objects fall into political and societal realms.  Buzan and Waever (1997) and 
Buzan et al (1998) identify what exactly is threatened when the state and 
society are at risk—sovereignty and identity, respectively.  For a state, having 
the authority and autonomy to govern and rule a geographic area remains 
the core and purpose of a state. It is why it exists.  On the other hand, identity 
as a nation, as a community, as a group of people signifies the existence of 
society.  Identity composes society. 
According to the published discourse, drug trade and its 
manifestations reckon hazardously against state sovereignty and societal 
identity.  Of the instances in which threat perception creation occurred in the 
news, 65% of the discourse remarked on political sovereignty either to the 
state as a whole, or to geographic region(s) of Guatemala.  For example, 
reports of the ‘loss of governance’ and authority in areas where drug 
trafficking exists along with threats to the democratic political institutions 
from cartel pervasion allow readers sympathetic development toward the 
government in an effort to legitimize government actions.  If the public 
desired the continuation of democratic governance provided by the current 
regime, the use of discourse about threats toward the administration would 
reinforce such sympathetic resonance.  
Additionally, this threat perception to the government paralleled 
threat perception to the Guatemalans as a nation and community.  The 
analyzed sample portrayed drug trade as a threat to the community and 
social fabric of Guatemala, and particularly its youth.  With just under half 
  34 
(44%) of all mentions of threat regarding communal and solidarity threats, 
the discourse appeared to activate the close-to-home and in-my-backyard 
perception of drug trade to all Guatemalans.  Again, this perception 
disseminated toward the general public presents drug trade as an immediate, 
proximal and potential destruction of the societal base in which citizens 
operate.  
Other threats mentioned include danger to the macroeconomic 
stability of Guatemala (12%) along with harm to the biosphere and 
environment of the natural Guatemalan landscape in areas with high drug 
trade activity (5%).14   
Actors at Play. A goal of this study is to determine which elite actors 
are actually securitizing drug trade.  Although El Diario is essentially directed 
by the national government at large, by quantifying the quoted and 
mentioned actors that have pushed the Us versus Them and threat 
perceptions along with highly politicized discourse, one can assume the 
actors as part sources of securitization.  For this research, no emphasis or 
weight was placed on the actors according to which step of securitization in 
which they participated; so, an actor instigating rapid and dramatic military 
recourse was counted equally to another actor depicting drug cartels as a 
high, valid threat to the state.   
Of the quoted and referenced actors that played a part in the 
securitization discourse, two primary ‘actors’ surfaced.  The first ‘elite group’ 
                                                        
14
 Percentages total more than 100% as some articles featured more than 
one type of perceived threat. 
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playing an active role in drug-trade framing appears as the national 
government.  Each sampled article was more than twice more likely to 
feature security speech from a representative of the national government as 
than anywhere else.15  Broken down further, this observation developed 
from the executive office, represented by President Colom, along with other 
office holders, particularly from the Ministerio de Gobernación, with 20% and 
35% of the total speech-acts.  This information, then, suggests that the 
national government, playing the role of the national elite, purposefully 
propagated news stories of dramatization in order to securitize drug trade to 
the national public.  
Additionally, international statesmen, particularly from the United 
States and Mexico were featured largely as supporting securitization of 
trafficking for Guatemala.  Despite much of Guatemala’s concern and 
resulting action has taken place within the confines of its own geopolitical 
borders, the analysis suggests international pressure and corroboration with 
drug trade securitization.  On a level equal to that of the President’s 
communication (20%), El Diario illustrated an international elite actor as 
well.  Curiously, it remains to be analyzed the role in which an international 
actor can help securitize this matter via a domestic outlet!  This remains a 
point of interest as Guatemala remains a developing state whilst Mexico and 
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 This may be confounded with the implication that interviewing 
government officials is easily accessible to a government-sponsored newspaper.  
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the United States, both of which issued their own ‘wars on drugs,’ come from 
core positions in the world system.16   
 Securitization Patterns and Analysis. The analysis of discourse 
provided by the national government in El Diario uncovers strong speech-act 
patterns that are displayed in multiple formats.  The first prospect at 
illustrating and identifying speech-acts and securitizing discourse looks at 
the actual rhetoric implemented.  The language exercised throughout the 
newspaper depicts drug trade for Guatemala from a dramatized perspective 
in which drugs are something to be physically fought and combated.  Ronaldo 
Robles, the secretary of Social Communication of the Presidency, ascribed the 
need for “extreme measures” (‘medidas extremas’) in the capture of 
traffickers (El Diario de Centroamérica, 10 February 2009).  Additional 
rhetoric included aggressive and warlike positions against trade.  One 
reporter claimed the “drugs must be fought” (‘el narcotráfico debe ser 
combatido’) while others accounted Guatemala as a nation-state must “fight 
against drug trafficking and crime” (‘combato al tráfico y a la delincuencia’) 
because the state is “caught in a crossfire of the major drug flows” 
(‘encuentra atrapada en el fuego cruzado de los grandes flujos de droga’) (El 
Diario de Centroamérica 22 March 2010, 10 September 2010, 6 March 2009).   
 This point is furthered by the fact that most of the news reports 
featured only discourse and coverage sympathetic to securitization.  Of the 
                                                        
16
 This is not to equate Guatemala‟s situation to those of the United State 
or Mexico, as Guatemala, given its domestic political history, may be more 
nuanced.  
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sampled articles, only three stories featured ‘anti-politicization’ perspectives 
either through journalistic reporting or through quoting individuals against 
high politicization.  All, though, were not strictly anti-dramatization, but were 
at best embedded in reports to neutralize securitizing efforts.  For example, 
in a July 2009 article, journalist Agustín Ortiz reported on the community 
reactions to “national terror” along the border.  He includes quotes from a 
military officer advancing securitization speech, but juxtaposed the quote 
with those of Agustín Tebalán, an activist of Frente Nacional Contra las 
Represas: “They say that the reactivation of detachments is to fight drug 
trafficking, but that has meaning, which is seeking to strengthen the viability 
of large military projects, reinforcing military force to counter a social 
struggle”17 (El Diario de Centroamérica 22 July 2009). Although this article 
does well to present another voice and perspective on the matter, I did not 
determine this article as anti-politicization, as the discourse by the author 
and his inclusion of other pro-high politicization proponents.  The other two 
articles featuring such perspectives were also embedded into high 
politicization articles. Therefore, the usage of negative discourse did not 
stand out on its own, but by sheer number of mentions and sentiments 
became overshadowed.  
 
                                                        
17
 Translated from: „Dicen que la reactivación de los destacamentos es 
para combatir el narcotráfico, pero eso tiene su sentido, lo que buscan es 
viabilizar los megaproyectos reforzando la fuerza military para contrarrestar la 
lucha social.‟ 
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The coded results also reflect these efforts.  Using the threshold scale 
of securitizing attempts, the aggregate means show Guatemala’s moves.  
Figure 1 shows the analyzed results over the two years of coded content.  
Within the sample, the article scores were averaged over the two-month 
increments in order to help even out the sample break-up and establish a 
more representative distribution of the articles.  The means come from a 
range of three to ten articles in the two-month period with an average of 4.8 
articles.  As can been seen, over two years El Diario issued discursive 
practices securitizing drug trade and raising the issue out of the realm of 
normal politicization to an issue of high politicization in which the 
government can face drug trade with measures beyond the status quo.  Only 
one time did the mean dip below the securitization threshold of 2.0 and not 
by much.  Additionally, the overall mean of all coded articles is 2.99, which is 
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well above the threshold and borderline high securitization.  This descriptive 
statistic illustrates that almost half of the sample featured high securitization 
discourse pushed out to the readership.   
With this language, the government painted drug trade as an object 
that can be physically countered by extreme methods.  This metaphor helped 
legitimize the government’s ‘extreme measures,’ by having the public 
sympathize, connect, or in some way identify with the government’s 
(potential) action.  In doing so, the national government opens up new action 
pathways that would not have been otherwise acceptable to the general 
public of the democratic state.  
The Power of Images. Finally, I attempted to understand the usage and 
role visual, graphic material played in securitization through the news.  
Psychological and behavioral studies (Paivio and Foth 1970; Childers and 
Houston 1982, 1983) have demonstrated that individuals are more likely to 
remember visual images clearer (impact) and longer (duration) than text, I 
suspected that El Diario would feature main images along with the drug trade 
texts.18  This was coded as a dummy variable in which 1 = image present and 
0 = no image.  Performing a simple measure of association between present 
images and the security scale via Gamma test, I found a strong, positive 
                                                        
18
 For another study on the relationship between International Relations 
and imagery, see Cori Dauber, Winter 2001,” Image as Argument: The Impact of 
Mogadishu on U.S. Military Intervention,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 27, 
No. 2, 205-229.  Here, Dauber discusses the use of visual imagery in reporting 
and its effects on the American public, its approval of U.S. military operations, 
and the resulting changes in U.S. military action.  
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correlation (.75) between the securitizing discourse (evinced through the 
final score of the article) and pictorial publication.19  This means that as 
securitizing discourse becomes stronger, the presence of an image is more 
likely to be alongside the story.  This would suggest that readers would more 
likely absorb the content of the highest securitizing reports as they come 
with images to mentally store, thus facilitating the efforts of the actors.  
                                                        
19
 There was no significant correlation or statistic that differentiated the 
type of image (separated into a dyad of „violent/graphic‟ and „non-violent‟) and 
higher securitization scores as was originally suspected.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SPEECH ANALYSIS 
  Although the speeches by Álvaro Colom analyzed in this study only 
reach across one of his three years in office, the brief scope outside of the 
analyzed discourse of El Diario and provides an accurate glimpse into how 
the President uses discourse to securitize drug trafficking across many 
different audiences and platforms.  The speeches were selected on the basis 
that they substantively discussed drug trafficking in Guatemala and that, as a 
whole sample, they maintained a variety of factors: different audiences and 
occasions, televised/non-televised.20  With this broad scope, I was able to 
develop a simple sketch with how the government, as personified by Colom, 
painted a drug trade picture to (inter)national audiences.  
On a whole, the speeches relay a colorful message of the threat that 
drug trade and drug trafficking presents to the Guatemalan public. Table 1 
displays the language and discourse that President Colom offered to military, 
international, and citizen audiences.  In all of his discourse, Colom connected 
to the general public and appeals to broad audiences through emotional 
discourse protecting the citizens of Guatemala, as opposed to the state or 
government.  He conveyed a threatening image of a “scourge” (flagelo)—the 
cause of great trouble or suffering—in many of his speeches to provoke a 
threat that drug trade has on the entire nation.  He also went beyond just 
threats with his discourse to dramatize the situation.   
                                                        
20
 See Appendix B for a complete list of 2008 speeches translated and 
analyzed for this study.  
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Table 2: Speech-Acts and Discourse by President Álvaro Colom 
 
 
Interestingly, it is here that his use of language altered given the 
audience at large.  For specific audiences, such as the officers and military 
personnel at the naval base, he implemented more sober language, but 
evoked dramatization nonetheless in the build-up and intensification of the 
branch of the armed forces the audience represents.  For the international 
arena, he exhibited strong, war-like speech that showed the other states of 
the active, aggressive stance Guatemala took on this international issue. He 
equated countering drug trade efforts with a “battle” and object in which 
they “attacked.”  But for the lay public, we can see the language shift to 
Audience TV Referent 
Object(s) 
Threat Dramatization 
Military No Citizens         
Economy 
Environment 
“scourge of drugs” (2) 
(‘flagelo de la droga’) 
“The Naval Force…needs a 
serious and profound 
strengthening” (‘La Fuerza 
Naval…necesita de un 
fortalecimiento serio y 
profundo’) 
Public No Guatemalan youth 
(‘nuestra 
juventud’) 
“scourge”  
“activities rotting 
society” 
(‘actividades…en que 
están pudriendo 
nuestro sistema’) 
“supernatural effort” 
(‘esfuerzo sobrenatural’) 
“[cartels have] no limits in 
violence, terrorism” (‘no 
límites en violencia, en 
terrorism’) 
Public Yes Citizens “border of problems” 
(‘frontera de 
problemas’) 
“fighting the drug war” 
(‘dándole la guerra al 
narco’) 
International 
Statesmen 
(UN) 
No Citizens (youth) “scourge” (3) “attacking drug trafficking” 
(‘ataque al narcotráfico’) 
“battle” (‘enfrentamiento’) 
Public Yes Citizens  “monster with many 
heads” (‘un monstruo con 
un montón de cabezas’) 
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general, colorful, and highly dramatized speech in which drug trade is 
depicted as a “monster” and connected to “terrorism,” against which 
Guatemala as a nation must take “supernatural effort[s].” 
On a whole, Colom, on behalf of the Guatemalan state, has issued 
multiple speeches that develop upon and detail the drug trade situation and 
the efforts the state has made against it.  In these instances, the government 
sought to dramatize drug trade to lift the situation beyond the everyday 
problems like education, healthcare, economic recession, etc and attempt to 
convince many audiences that direct action must be taken to neutralize 
trafficking.  To do so, Colom has developed speech-acts in which the “war on 
drugs” can now be militarized and politicized to counter by means equal to 
that of an actual war from a threatening state.  Additionally, the state 
compounded this effort not by the continuous issuance of dramatized 
discourse, but in the absence of such discourse in other talks.   
In addition to the given talks for this analysis, I also looked at 
speeches by Colom that dealt with the social programs and with efforts to 
develop society and state at large (see Appendix B).  In these speeches that 
deal with state and social building, not one mention of drug trade, trafficking, 
or even abuse was mentioned.  In doing so, Colom explicitly chisels drug 
trafficking from the other forms of state control, building, and development.  
By removing the issue from the crowd of other problems, the government 
can then proceed to politicize and justify extreme action. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
This paper seeks to explore the writing and speech frames used to 
relay the current issues of drug trade and trafficking within Guatemala.  By 
investigating the discursive practices published by the national government 
towards its public, we can see that with the experience of drug trade, the 
government is actively trying to ‘securitize’ the issue as a way to implement 
drastic, dramatic, or even unprecedented counteraction to the phenomenon. 
This dramaturgical persuasion allows the government to foster 
legitimization and approval from the general public, so as to not produce 
large opposition to government securitization.   
These efforts are captured in two forms.  First, the discourse would 
portray drug trade as a fantastical, destructive, and scary ‘other’ in which the 
general public would not only view drug trafficking as an immediate threat 
about to pounce on the individual, but also as something distinct and 
separate from the daily life of Guatemalans.  This would effectively allow 
drug trade to move away from civil, normal political operations and be 
swooped up into the arms of the government to effectively and instantly 
neutralize.  Second, the discourse also illuminated sympathetic intonations of 
the physical, military efforts that were occurring at the time.  This helped the 
civilians see militarization and high politicization as acceptable for the 
government to be facilitating despite the fact that peace accords from just 
over a decade ago are still in effect to minimize the armed forces.  
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Although the “why-question” of Guatemala’s securitization preference 
lies beyond the bounds of this paper, one can hypothesize several factors that 
may have led to such discourse dissemination.   As was already mentioned, 
international diplomats from the United States and Mexico played a large 
part in providing the security speech-acts for El Diario.  It would appear, 
then, that Guatemala faces international pressures to securitize and, as a 
result, militarize drug trade within its borders.  But there are also domestic 
factors at play.  The most recent report of the International Crisis Group 
(2010), which produces case studies to ‘prevent conflict worldwide,’ found 
that Guatemala continues to face large swaths of impunity within law 
enforcement and that inequality may help push civilians to complicity with 
drug cartels as a means of employment. Thus, it may appear easier for the 
government to divert funding and opportunity away from the local police 
forces and into the military in order to sidestep impunity issues and 
immediately curb drug trade activity.  Although one may question the 
validity over improving the state over time with these measures. 
Beyond these action-based conveniences for Guatemala to securitize 
drug trade, the theoretical underpinnings of securitization suggest the 
opposite.  Ole Waever (1995) treats securitization as a constant negative, as a 
failure to deal with issues of normal politics.21  With this, Waever advocates 
for strategic desecuritization in which securitization is reversed and issues 
are shifted from high politicization.  In doing so, the actor(s) can deal with 
                                                        
21
 This perspective is also shared in Buzan et al. 1998: 29.  
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the topic in the ‘rules’ of a democratic political system.  Waever, and later 
Buzan et al (1998) treat desecuritization as political acts and thus achieved 
through normal political processes.  Although securitization theory only 
seeks to answer what security does and is nothing beyond a “theoretical tool 
to facilitate practical security analysis” (Taureck 2006), this analytical tool 
suggests Guatemala re-moves drug trade and trafficking into the scope of 
normal politics in order to stabilize the domestic situation at hand.  By 
presenting drug trade as a political issue to be taken care of through the 
embedded political avenues in Guatemala’s democratic institutions, the state 
can desecuritize the issue and handle the preceding problems through 
legislative and programmatic means.  
In addition to this practical policy-making implication, this paper also 
adds to the literature by implementing another empirical study under the 
Copenhagen framework.  Uniquely, this paper moves beyond stable, 
established democratic states and applies the analytic framework to a 
developing state in Central America to produce consistent results for variable 
states.  In this case, one can see how Guatemala, like other states, can use 
discourse to securitize an issue such as drug trade through media and 
government outlets.  This would help CS on a generalizable dimension as the 
national elite as actors respond similarly in framing their dramatized 
concerns. 
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APPENDIX A  
NEWSPAPER CONTENT ANALYSIS: GUATEMALA SECURITIZATION 
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VARIABLE DESCRIPTION             
CODE 
Article Number                      ___ ___ ___ 
Number of Paragraphs      ___ ___ ___ 
Date         __ __ __ __ 
Coder         ___ ___  
 
# of Articles in Section       ___ ___ 
 
Type of Article       ___  
1=News Story 
2=Editorial/Opinion 
3=Other 
 
Drugs/Drug Trade Mentioned in Headline    ___ 
1=Yes, 0=No 
 
Tone of Headline about Drug Trade    ___  
1=Positive, 2=Negative, 3=Mixed, 4=Neutral, 0=Not about drugs 
 
Tone of Article about Drug Trade     ___  
1=Positive, 2=Negative, 3=Mixed, 4=Neutral, 0=Not about drugs 
Number of Mentions about Us v Them    ___ ___ 
 
Number of Quotes about Us v Them    ___ ___ 
 
Source of Quotes about Us v Them     ___  
1=President        ___ 
2=Military Personnel      ___  
3=National Office Holder      ___ 
4=Local Office Holder 
5=Newspaper 
6=Citizen 
7=Interest Group/NGO 
8=International (Non-Guatemalan) Official 
9=Other __________________ 
 
 
Traits of Us v Them (Number of Mentions) 
Guatemalans     ___ ___ Drug Users    ___ ___ 
Citizens     ___ ___ Specific Drug Lords/Bosses  ___ ___ 
Communities/Towns     ___ ___ Drug Cartels  ___ ___ 
Political Groups      ___ ___  Mexicans/Foreigners___ ___ 
Families       ___ ___ Los Zetas  ___ ___ 
Social Groups       ___ ___ Criminal  ___ ___   
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Dehumanizing Features: ________________________________________ 
“Outsider” Features: ___________________________________________ 
 
Number of Mentions of Threat     ___ ___ 
 
Number of Quotes about Threat     ___ ___ 
 
Source of Quotes       ___  
1=President        ___ 
2=Military Personnel      ___   
3=National Office Holder      ___ 
4=Local Office Holder 
5=Newspaper 
6=Citizen 
7=Interest Group/NGO 
8=International (Non-Guatemalan) Official 
9=Other __________________ 
 
Referent Sector of Quotes 
1=Military 
2=Political 
3=Societal 
4=Environmental 
5=Economic 
 
Particular of Sector 1: ________________________________________ 
Particular of Sector 2: ________________________________________ 
Particular of Sector 3: ________________________________________ 
 
Traits of Threat (Number of Mentions) 
Safety (-)    ___ ___ Aggression     ___ ___ Threat      ___ ___ 
Safety (+)   ___ ___ Killing/Murder  ___ ___ Illegal      ___ ___ 
Violence    ___ ___ Destruction     ___ ___ Other      ___ ___ 
Menace      ___ ___ Harm      ___ ___ 
 
Number of Endorsements for High Politicization       ___ ___ 
 
Number of Quotes about High Politicization       ___ ___ 
 
Source Endorsements for High Politicization       ___  
1=President            ___ 
2=Military Personnel          ___  
3=National Office Holder          ___ 
4=Local Office Holder 
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5=Newspaper 
6=Citizen 
7=Interest Group/NGO 
8=International (Non-Guatemalan) Official 
9=Other____________________ 
 
Number of Criticisms for High Politicization       ___ ___ 
 
Number of Quotes against High Politicization       ___ ___ 
 
Source Criticisms for High Politicization        ___  
1=President            ___ 
2=Military Personnel          ___  
3=National Office Holder          ___ 
4=Local Office Holder 
5=Newspaper 
6=Citizen 
7=Interest Group/NGO 
8=International (Non-Guatemalan) Official 
9=Other____________________ 
 
 
Traits of High Politicization (Number of Mentions) 
Call for State Legislation (P1)      ___ ___   Call for National Movement/Action (S2)       ___ ___ 
Call for New Leadership (P2)       ___ ___  Call for City/Town High Action (S3)           ___ ___ 
Call for Pol. Restructuring (P3)   ___ ___ Environmental Awareness (En1)      ___ ___ 
Funding for Military (M1)             ___ ___     Environmental Pol. Responsibility (En2)      ___ ___ 
Arms/Technology Bldg (M2)       ___ ___ Environmental Action Call (En3)       ___ ___ 
Call to Action for Military (M3)   ___ ___ Call for Economic Reform/Change (Ec1)   ___ ___ 
Community Armaments (S1)       ___ ___ Call for Firm/Business Action (Ec2)   ___ ___ 
 
P=Political Sector; M=Military Sector; S=Societal Sector; En=Environmental Sector; Ec=Economic 
Sector  
 
Mention of Federal Actions Against Drug Trafficking 
Type: 1=Military, 2=Law Enforcement, 3=Social Program, 4=Economic 
Program, 5=Educational Program, 6=National Legislation, 7=Other 
 
Specify____________________________      Type: ____          Number of Mentions:    ____ 
Specify____________________________      Type: ____          Number of Mentions:    ____ 
Specify_____________________________     Type: ____          Number of Mentions:    ____ 
 
 
Mention of Symbolic Actions Against Drug Trafficking 
Type: 1=Speech, 2=Conference, 3=Visit, 4=Photo Opportunity 
Economic Program, 5=Educational Program, 6=National Legislation, 
7=Other 
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Specify____________________________      Type: ____          Number of Mentions:    ____ 
Specify____________________________      Type: ____          Number of Mentions:    ____ 
Specify____________________________      Type: ____          Number of Mentions:    ____ 
 
Use of Image 
 
1=Yes        ___ 
0=No 
 
# of Images in Section     ___ ___ 
 
Drugs            ___ ___ Political Leader     ___ ___ 
Drug Cartels       ___ ___ Community Leader     ___ ___ 
Violent Scene During     ___ ___ Community Scene      ___ ___ 
Violent Scene Aftermath     ___ ___ Human Scene      ___ ___ 
 
Securitization Scale Score: ___ 
Non-Drug Related Articles in Section: ___ 
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 ÁLVARO COLOM SPEECHES 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Listed chronologically. 
 
 
1. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. January 18, 2008. “XLIX ANIVERSARIO 
DE FUNDACIÓN DE LA MARINA DE LA DEFENSA NACIONAL.” 
Fundación de la Marina de la Defensa Nacional, Guatemala. 
 
2. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. March 3, 2008. The Inauguration of “Consejo 
de Cohesión Social. Guatemala. 
 
3. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. March 25, 2008. “DISCURSO DEL 
PRESIDENTE ALVARO COLOM EN LA INAUGURACIÓN DE LAS 
FUERZAS DE INTERVENCIÓN AEREA ANTIDROGA Y TERRORISMO.” 
Guatemala City, Guatemala. 
 
4. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. April 12, 2008. Lanzamiento “Mi Familia 
Progresa.” Guatemala. 
 
5. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. April 25, 2008. Huehuetenango, Guatemala.  
 
6. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. September 6, 2008. The Inauguration of the 
“Gobernando con la Gente” program.  
Totonicapán, Guatemala. 
 
7. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. September 24, 2008. “DISCURSO DEL 
PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA INGENIERO 
ÁLVARO COLOM CABALLEROS PRONUNCIADO DURANTE EL 63º 
PERÍODO DE SESIONES DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE LAS 
NACIONES UNIDAS.” United Nations, New York City, New York. 
 
8. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. October 20, 2008. “CONMEMORACIÓN.” 
Guatemala City, Guatemala. 
